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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
COURTS-FEDERAL PROCEDURE-FEDERAL COURT JURIS-
DICTION OBT.AINED ON GROUNDS THAT DEFENDANT
HAS CLAIMED AND WILL CLAIM MORE THAN THE JURIS-
DICTIONAL AMOUNT
Horton, petitioner in this cause, alleging that he was injured while em-
ployed, filed a claim before the Texas Industrial Accident Board against
the respondent insurance company for $14,035 and was awarded $1,050.
The day of the award, the insurance company filed a suit' in the United
States, District Court to set aside the board's $1,050 award. Jurisdiction
was claimed on the grounds of diversity of citizenship and that the
amount in controversy exceeded $10,000 because, the insurance company
alleged, Horton "claims and will claim ' 2 $14,035.3 One week later Horton
brought an action in a Texas State Court to set aside the $1,050 award
and to recover $14,035. Horton then moved to dismiss respondent's fed-
eral court suit on the grounds that the court was without jurisdiction
because the amount in controversy was $1,050 (the amount of the actual
award by the Accident Board) and not the $14,035 which he had sought.
Subject to the ruling on this motion, Horton filed a counterclaim in this
federal court action for $14,035. The District Court held that only
$1,050 was the amount in controversy and dismissed the insurance com-
pany's suit for want of jurisdiction.4 The United States Court of Appeals
reversed the decision5 and after granting certiorari, 6 the Supreme Court
of the United States affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in holding
that the District Court had jurisdiction, for the amount in controversy
was $14,035. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961).
After deciding that federal and not state standards determine the
amount in controversy,7 and then recognizing that the purpose of recent
congressional enactments was to reduce congestion in the federal courts,8
' The suit is permitted by TExAs ANN. CIv. STAT. Arts. 8307 § 5 (Vernon 1959).
2 Liberty Mutual's original complaint filed April 30, 1959 before the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
8 28 U.S.C. S 1332, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1958). For the district courts to have original
jurisdiction the controversy must exceed the sum or value of $10,000.
4 Brief for Petitioner, Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961).
5 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Horton, 275 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1960).
6 Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 814 (1960).
7 Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
8 The Congress enacted:
a) 28 U.S.C. S 1332, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1958); which reduces congestion by
I. Deeming corporations, citizens of the State where it has its principal place of
business.
2. When plaintiff receives judgment for less than $10,000 the District Court may
impose costs on the plaintiff.
b) 28 U.S.C. S 1445 (c), 28 U.S.C.A. 1445 (c) (1958) which prohibits the removal
of Workmen's Compensation cases from state courts to District Courts.
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the Court pointed out that 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1445 (c)(1.958) provides that
"a civil action in any state court arising under Workman's Compensation
Laws of such state may not be removed to any District Court of the
United States." Since the Supreme Court of Texas interprets a suit to set
aside an award of the Texas Industrial Accident Board as a trial de novo,
the insurance company's suit in the federal district court is not a removal
action, but an original action not mentioned by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1445 (c),
and thus not barred by that section. The dissent states that "the Court
goes out of its way to defeat the Congressional intent"' 0 in that the Court
did not deny federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1445 (c)" even
though Congress in enacting the section was deliberately trying to re-
lieve the federal courts of their heavy burden.12 However, the statutory
bar is to prohibit removal actions only, and clearly this was an original
action. Certainly the majority of the Court is correct in not manipulating
perfectly lucid language into what the Court thought Congress must
have intended.
In determining whether or not the insurance company's federal suit
was a removal action in violation of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1445 (c), the Court
said that the trial in the Federal District Court was a trial de novo.
Burstein v. Millikin Trust Co. 13 defines de novo as "meaning 'fresh' or
'anew' . . . A de novo trial . . . is a trial had as if no action whatever
had been instituted in the court below."'1 4 The Supreme Court, after
stating that the suit in the Federal District Court was "wholly without
reference to what may have been decided by the Board,"' 5 and hence an
original action not barred by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1445 (c), concludes that
$14,035 is the amount in controversy because it was the amount previous-
ly claimed before the Board. It appears inconsistent to treat the Board
action as "no action whatever"'16 and not to recognize it when deter-
mining that the insurance company's action is an original suit and then
to recognize the action before the Board when determining the amount
in controversy.
The other factors that the Court considered instrumental in placing
the amount in controversy at $14,035 are (1) Horton counterclaimed for
9 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (c), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1445 (c) (1958) (Emphasis added).
10 Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 362 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
11 Although the dissent carefully avoids specifically referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (c),
it was cognizant of the statute when making the statement, for~the majority had made
reference to it.
12 Supra, note 8.
13 350 I. App. 462, 13 N.E.2d 339 (1953).
14 d. at 466, 113 N.E.2d at 341.
15 Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 355 (1961).
16 Burstein v. Milikan Trust Co., 350 Ill. App. 462,466, 13 N.E.2d 339, 341 (1953).
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$14,035; (2) there was no denial by Horton of the company's allegations
that he would claim the jurisdictional amount; (3) Horton did not dis-
claim or surrender any part of his original claim as he counterclaimed
for the full $14,035; and (4) Horton's claim in the State Court, filed one
week after the insurance company's federal suit, was for $14,035. Since
these factors all happened after the filing of the company's suit, the
Supreme Court is relying on events occurring after the suit was filed in
the District Court in order to establish that the averred $14,035 is in
controversy. But events subsequent to the filing of an action should have
no effect in determining federal jurisdiction, 17 for "[f]ederal jurisdiction
depends on the facts at the time the suit is commenced, and subsequent
changes neither confer or divest it. This is well settled as to diversity of
citizenship."' 8 "[Jjurisdiction depends on the situation as it exists at the
time the suit is brought and not on what happens thereafter."'19 The
court states in Barnes v. Parker:20
We had thought that it was now established beyond all debate that, in
determining the amount in controversy in actions sought to be removed, the
Court to which removal is sought determines the question solely by looking
to the amount in good faith prayed for as damnum in the complaint . . .
regardless of subsequent events in the action . . . amounts claimed by way
of counterclaim could not be considered as increasing the amount of the re-
quired sum.2 '
In recognizing Horton's actions after the filing of the insurance com-
pany's suit, the Court has departed from the existing federal rule for-
bidding reliance on such acts for establishing jurisdiction.
The insurance company is not able to show on the face of its own
pleadings that $14,035 is in controversy, except by conjecture and antici-
pating that the petitioner will counterclaim for $14,035. Similar cases
have shown that the plaintiff cannot anticipate the defendant's answer
to place the claim within federal jurisdiction. 22 An analysis of these deci-
17 St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938); Division 525
Order of Ry. Conductors of America v. Gorman, 133 F. 2d 273 (8th Cir. 1943); National
Sur. Corp. v. City of Excelsior Springs, 123 F. 2d 573 (8th Cir. 1941). "[A]nd though,
as here, the plaintiff after removal, by stipulation, by affidavit, or by amendment of his
pleadings, reduces the claim below the requisite amount, this does not deprive the dis-
trict court of jurisdiction." Id. at 577; LeVinski v. Middlesex Baking Co., 92 F. 449 (5th
Cir. 1899); Dobie, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE § 56 (1928) states that a counter-
claim should play no part in determining the amount in controversy.
'8 Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc. v. Volentine, 64 F. 2d 800, 801 (5th Cir. 1933) (Emphasis
added); New Century Cas. Co. v. Chase, 39 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. W.Va. 1941).
19 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rose, 294 F. 122, 123 (6th Cir. 1923).
20 126 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
21 Id. at 651. (Emphasis added.)
22 Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74 (1914). The Court held that, "it rested with the de-
fendants to select their ground of defense...." Id. at 75; Taylor v. Smith, 167 F. 2d 797
(7th Cir. 1948).
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sions suggests that the defendant and not the plaintiff could have acquired
federal jurisdiction. In Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mottley,23 Mottley was
injured by the defendant railroad and in consideration for the promise to
issue him free railroad passes for the rest of his life, he released the de-
fendant of its liability for personal injuries. The railroad then refused to
give the promised passes, and Mottley filed suit for specific performance
pleading federal jurisdiction on the grounds that the railroad would raise
the defense that a Congressional enactment prohibits the giving of free
passes. Mottley claimed that the purpose of his suit was to determine if
the enactments were in violation of the fifth amendment. The Court dis-
missed the action for want of jurisdiction holding that "[it] is not enough
that the plaintiff alleges ... that the defense is invalidated by some provi-
sion in the Constitution of the United States. '24 The Court continued: 2
It would be wholly unnecessary and improper in order to prove complain-
ant's cause of action to go into any matter of defense which the defendants
might possibly set up and then attempt to reply to such defense and thus, if
possible, to show that a Federal question might or probably would arise in
the course of the trial of the case. [This] is inconsistent with any known rule
of pleading so far as we are aware, and is improper.26
In the case of Joy v. City of St. Louis27 the plaintiff alleged in an eject-
ment action that the federal courts have jurisdiction over the controversy
because certain acts of Congress and certain United States land patents
regarding the land in controversy are disputed and contested by the
parties. The Court held that it was without jurisdiction and inferred
that only the defendant could put the Congressional Acts and Patents in
controversy.
Although in Horton the Court states, "No matter which party brings
it [the suit] into court, the controversy remains the same," 28 the courts
have established that there is a distinction between an ordinary contro-
versy between two parties and the legal controversy required to obtain
federal jurisdiction. The federal courts may or may not have jurisdiction
depending on who institutes the claim. If the defendants, in the mentioned
23 211 U.S. 149 (1908). See also International Refugee Organization v. Republic Steam-
ship Corp., 92 F. Supp. 674 (D. C. Md. 1950).
24 Id. at 152.
251d. at 153; quoting from Boston & M. Consol. Copper & Silver Mining Co. v. Mon-
tana Ore Purchasing Co., 188 U.S. 632, 638-39 (1903). The facts in the Boston case
were that in the plaintiff's bill to quiet title of mining lands, he alleged he is owner of
the property taken by the defendant and that the federal court jurisdiction is acquired
over the complaint because the defendant will assert an invalid United States land patent
as a defense. Held: that the court was without jurisdiction.
2 6 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149,153 (1908).
27201 U.S. 332 (1906).
28Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 307 U.S. 348, 354 (1961).
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cases, rather than the plaintiffs, had commenced the federal action to
litigate the disputes, the district court would have had jurisdiction; and al-
though the converse has never been allowed, the Supreme Court has
anomalously permitted the company to plead Horton's defense.
The only rule applied by the Court in determining the amount in con-
troversy in the Horton case is that it is the amount in the complaint un-
less not claimed in "good faith." Good faith is determined, according to
the' Court, by the inability to establish as a legal certainty that the claim
is really for less than the jurisdictional requirement. In support of the
doctrine the Court cited St. Paul Mercury Idem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.29
where the plaintiff alleged more than the jurisdictional amount in his
pleadings and later attached an exhibit enumerating his injuries fixing an
amount less than the jurisdictional requirements. The Court applied the
legal certainty phrase and found that it was with jurisdiction for there is
no "evidence that the petitioner [defendant] . . . had reason to believe,
that the respondent's claim, whether well or ill founded in law of fact
involves less than. [the jurisdictional amount] ."30 The St. Paul case em-
ploys the legal certainty phrase to decide the factual question involving
evidence of the plaintiff's good faith; yet in the Horton case there is no
question of Liberty Mutual's veracity. In National Sec. Corp. v. City of
Excelsior Springs3 1 where the plaintiff claimed $3,200 and after com-
mencing the action and then realizing that he was entitled to less than
$3000,32 he signed a statement that he had erred; the court found that
3,200 w'as the amount in controversy as long as the initial claim 'was not
colored and was in good faith.
These cases, apply the "legal certainty" rule to a situation where the
claim is for an unliquidated amount33 and the court must determine if
29 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
80 Id. at 296. (Emphasis added.)
31, 123 F. 2d 573 (8th Cir. 1941).
32 At the time the jurisdictional amount in diversity cases was $3,000.
33 Colonial Oil Co. v. Vining, 237 F. 2d 913 (5th Cir. 1956); Olan Mills v. Enterprise
Pub. Co., 210 F. 2d 895 (5th Cir. 1954) involves ascertaining of damages in a libel and
slander action; Burks v. Texas Co., 211 F. 2d 443 (5th Cir. 1954). "This is also an action
for unliquidated damages, where the amount in controversy is ordinarily the sum
claimed by the plaintiff in good faith." Id. at 445. (Emphasis added.) Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co.'. Flowers, 330 U.S. 464 (1947). In a state where subsequent payments due after the
suit is filed are considered a part of a single action, the court held that since it is not
absolutely certain that the installment subsequently due will not equal the jurisdictional
amount (death terminates defendant's liability), the court has jurisdiction over the con-
troversy for there is not a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the jurisdic-
tional minimum; Bell v. Preferred Life Assur. Socy., 320 U.S. 238 (1943). "Therefore
even though petitioner is limited to actual damages of $1,000, as both courts held [Dis-
trict Court and Circuit Court of Appeals], the question remains whether it is apparent
to a legal certainty from the compaint that he [plaintiff] could not recover, in addition,
sufficient punitive damages, [$2,000] to make up the requisite $3,000." Id. at 240.
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the "claim [is] evidently fictitious in character and alleged merely to
create the jurisdictional amount. . . ,,14 Only those claims involving
an unliquidated amount that may be exaggerated so as to obtain federal
jurisdiction require the application of the "legal certainty" doctrine to
establish the legitimate value of the unliquidated damages; yet the doc-
trine is employed in the Horton case to determine Whether to a legal
certainty the insurance company's claim of $14,035 is in violation to the
rules of pleading. Clearly, the doctrine is only employed to resolve issues
involving factual controversies of determining damages and not contro-
versies involving legal issues such as whether or not the Court, in de-
termining the amount in controversy, can look to Horton's claim before
the Board, his subsequent state action, and his federal counterclaim.
Although the Court correctly interpreted 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1445 (c) pro-
hibiting original Workmen's Compensation claims in the Federal District
Court, it broke with precedent when it placed $14,035 in controversy
by: (1) recognizing the Board's action; (2) permitting the company to
place facts in controversy that happened after the filing of the suit, and
(3) allowing the plaintiff to allege and reply to a conjectural defense
before the defendant answered the complaint. Finally, the Court ap-
parently applied the "legal certainty" doctrine to an issue of law rather
than to a factual controversy. Subsequent to this writing rehearing has
been denied,85 and the departure from the well-established rule is now
law.
84 Burks v. Texas Co., 211 F. 2d 443,446 (5th Cir. 1959). (Emphasis added.)
35 30 U.S. L. WEEK 3115 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1961).
FEDERAL TAXATION-THE DETERMINATION OF WIL-.,
FULNESS IN FAILURE TO PAY TAX CASES
Defendant Goodman filed a timely federal income tax return for 1953.
He failed to pay his income tax liability for that year which he was re-
quired to pay on or before March 15, 1954. The tax due on his 1953 re-
turn was $4,457.48. Beginning in 1955, the defendant made several pay-
ments on his 1953 tax liability. Goodman's personal debts exceeded his
assets before and during the period of his tax liability. After extensive
attempts at collection by the Internal Revenue Service, that agency in-
formed the defendant that criminal prosecution was being recommended
to the Department of Justice. Full payment of the unpaid balance of .his
income taxes for 1953, together with interest, was made by the defendant
on January 8, 1957. The defendant was indicted on January 14, 1957 for
wilful failure to pay income taxes at the time required by law.
This was the first prosecution ever brought under the "wilful failure to
